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“The form of association ... which if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in the end to 
predominate, is not that which can exist with capitalist as chief, and workpeople without a voice in 
the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively 
owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected 
and removable by themselves.” 
John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 1848  
 
1 Introduction 
The empirical evidence, see e.g. Fakhfakh, Perotin, & Gago (2012), suggests that workers’ 
cooperatives are at least as productive as their capitalist counterparts, and their members report a 
high quality of working life. However, cooperatives account for only 3% - 6% of GDP in most market 
economies. In such economies there is apparently nothing to stop workers forming a cooperative if 
they believed it would offer benefits superior to those available in a conventional capitalist firm. It is 
therefore of interest to investigate the factors, peculiar to cooperatives, which determine their 
productivity. This should help to explain the relative paucity of cooperatives in the market 
economies, and inform policy towards them.  
Some of these issues are investigated empirically by Jones and Backus (1977), Gagliardi (2009), 
Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2006), Estrin and Jones (1992) and George (1993a), but all five 
sources use datasets significantly less comprehensive than ours. Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago (2012) 
is one of the few contributions that have tested productivity in cooperatives in a systematic way.  
 
2 Summary of Theory 
The standard economic theory of cooperatives is the Ward/Vanek/Meade income per worker 
maximising model (Ward, 1958), (Vanek, 1970), (Meade, 1986). In its simplest version the model 
assumes full capital-renting (equivalent to full external finance). This assumption is clearly 
unrealistic, and the analysis of finance for the self-managed firm must clearly go beyond the 
simplifying assumption of full external finance, a topic which has generated a great deal of 
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controversy: see, for example, Dow (2018). Given the necessity to accumulate internal funds (owned 
patrimony) to build collateral guarantees towards external financers, it is necessary to study how 
real world cooperative enterprises do accumulate owned capital, and the related limitations to this 
process. Well-known results concerning the undercapitalization hypothesis state that when the 
ownership of capital is socialized (this applied to public ownership, social ownership and common 
ownership) worker cooperatives are likely to under-invest and produce at a too small scale, that is 
with increasing returns to scale (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970; Vanek, 1970). Given these premises, 
the three critical issues, for the purpose of this paper, are: the Furubotn-Pejovich and the Vanek 
effects, and risk sharing in worker cooperatives.  
 
2.1 The Furubotn–Pejovich and Vanek effects 
Furubotn and Pejovich, initially in 1970, have repeatedly argued that cooperatives are fatally flawed 
by their failure to allocate property rights appropriately. This approach forms the nucleus of what 
has come to be known as the ‘Texas school’. In particular, Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) have argued 
that the collective nature of property rights in a cooperative’s capital will induce it to under-invest. 
In taking investment decisions in a cooperative, members will be influenced by the fact that they 
may leave the firm during the economic lifetime of newly acquired capital. Since this capital is 
collectively owned, such members would not be able to recoup ‘their part’ of the principal and 
would forgo some of the returns. Cooperatives cannot issue shares to outside shareholders because 
this would transfer some of the right to manage to these shareholders, and the firm would cease to 
be fully controlled by its members. Moreover, in most national contexts, there is no market in 
membership rights, even if several projects have been put forward to accomplish it (for a wide 
review of this literature and new proposals, see Dow, 2018). Markets for membership rights are 
absent in the Italian context.   
Under these circumstances, the members’ “truncated temporal horizon” results in investment 
rationing and inefficient allocation of capital funds (Tortia, 2007). The internal rate of return 
required for the investment to take place is biased upwards when compared to the efficient rate 
(the market rate). The level of investment is correspondingly biased downwards, thus engendering 
under-capitalization. The horizon effect is especially severe in the case of long term and not highly 
remunerative investments, since this kind of asset depreciates over spans of time that are much 
longer than the typical tenure of worker-members in co-operatives. Correspondingly, worker 
cooperatives are very rarely observed, or completely absent in industrial sectors characterised by 
high capital intensity and long run duration of investments (e.g. utilities). The horizon effect can be 
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severe also when the members’ median age increases and newcomers are smaller in numbers than 
quitting or retiring members, since in this case the median horizon shrinks.1  On the other hand, it 
must be said that increasing median age can be a normal occurrence in declining industries, in which 
case declining investments may not be considered as inefficient.  This is so because declining 
industries are characterised by declining investment and job creation rates, implying that the median 
age of the incumbent workforce would tend to increase, holding all other conditions constant. 
Empirically, it is difficult to determine whether the internal rate of return on cooperative 
investments is inefficient, that is higher that the market (efficient) interest rate. However, it is 
possible to determine if co-operatives produce at increasing returns to scale. 
Vanek (1977) put forward a different but related argument. He argued that, under internal financing, 
cooperatives will not pay a scarcity-reflecting rent for the use of capital, thus changing their 
maximand. He shows that this will lead to the firm operating at an inefficiently low scale. Figure 1 
depicts equilibrium outcomes for external and internal financing, assuming both Furubotn–Pejovich 
and Vanek effects at work. They lead the cooperative to operate (in the long run) at too low a 
capital/labour ratio and too low a scale (see figure 1). This is Pareto-inefficient and would mean the 
cooperative losing a competition with a conventional, profit-maximising firm in possession of the 
same production function (the cooperative’s “capitalist twin”). Full external finance would cause 
both the scale effect and the capital intensity effect to disappear, but cooperatives cannot use 
external equity finance, because that would dilute members’ control rights.2 In the presence of full 
external finance, worker members would not participate in financial risks inherent to the business 
venture (they would not contribute any collateral guarantee to their debts). Once lenders 
understand the high level of risk they would incur in financing the co-operative, they would 
withdraw their financial support, leaving cooperative members to bear capital risks in addition to 
risks associated with employment, a situation often unfavourably compared with the allegedly 
efficient allocation of risk under capitalism. In addition to this, there remains the problem of 
‘increasing risk’. Even though bonds carry a fixed and certain rate of interest, there remains the 
possibility of default, and the probability of the lender suffering a loss increases as the proportion of 
equity capital in the financial structure decreases. The lender, therefore, demands a higher rate of 
 
1 This latter condition may not be problematic in declining industries and sectors, in which the disappearance 
of existing organizations can be a normal occurrence (Tortia, 2018). 
2 Several proposals have been put forward for implementing quasi share financial instruments, but they will 
not be treated in this paper. See for example ‘risk participation bonds’ (McCain 1977), ‘variable income 
debentures’ (Vanek 1977), ‘non-voting, residual value added renewables shares’ (Major, 1996) and (George 
(1993b)) 
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return and the cost of bond-financed capital rises at the margin (MaCain, 1977; Schlicht, and von 
Weizsäcker, 1977, Jensen and Meckling, 1979, Ellerman, 1986; van der Weerden, 2016). The 
problem of ‘increasing risk’ would lead to insufficient external finance, forcing worker members to 
intervene with their own financial resources or to have the cooperative under-capitalized. Finally, a 
fixed commitment to interest and principal repayments gears the risk to residual claimants, who in a 
co-operative are its members, thus reducing their willingness to undertake further borrowing.  
Collective property rights, for example in the form of indivisible reserves of capital not recoupable by 
members both during the life and upon the dissolution of the co-operative, wherein indivisible 
reserves are owned by the co-operative itself and not by individual members, run the risk of 
generating the Furubotn-Pejovich and Vanek effects. However, by creating resources owned by the 
co-operative3 (serving the function of investment finance, collateral guarantee for borrowing and 
insurance funds in favour of cooperative members), they can fruitfully mitigate increasing risk, that 
is increasing cost of capital and unwillingness of external financiers to lend. The net effect of these 
two opposing forces (undercapitalization and increased patrimonial stability) cannot be ex ante 
determined. It depends on several factors, including, but not limited to, the temporal horizon 
(Tortia, 2018). For example, the net effect depends on the increased potential for the cooperative to 
preserve its owned resources (both human and non-human) in negative economic contingencies, 
and to renew its membership by progressively including younger members (thus weakening the 
constraint represented by the truncated temporal horizon).   
Empirical research has a fundamental role in disentangling theoretical limitations and 
contrasting conclusions. From this point of view, comparative analysis at the national level appears 
to be especially fruitful. Econometric results published in the study including the analysis of French 
data by Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago (2012) use French national data and a translog specification of 
the production unction. French worker cooperatives are less capitalized than capitalist enterprises, 
but only in some specific sectors (capital goods, transport and consumer services), while in all other 
sectors the level of capitalization is similar in the two types of firm. The authors show that worker 
cooperatives do not operated at a too low scale of production, even if they are most likely to 
operate at constant returns to scale, while capitalist enterprises operate at decreasing returns to 
scale. Furthermore, this study also shows that cooperatives are no less productive than capitalist 
enterprises, even if the two types of firms uses different technologies, that is different mixes of the 
labour and capital factors. Another study carried out in Italy on financial statements of Italian 
 
3 In Italian cooperatives, the incidence of collective reserves on equity is around 86% (Fontanari and Borzaga, 
2018).  
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cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) provides some interesting insights (Fontanari, 2018). 
In fact, this study highlights the fact that Italian cooperatives enjoy a higher leverage effect than 
their capitalist twins. This is the proof that, on one hand, cooperatives are able to adequately exploit 
external financing and, on the other, that banks consider them bankable. In addition, another 
important aspect concerns the ability of cooperatives to generate a capital turnover higher than that 
of investor-owned firms. This condition assures adequate levels of liquidity in cooperatives – i.e. not 
lower than those shown by investor owned firms (IOFs) – thanks to the labour-intensive nature of 
activities usually undertaken by cooperatives. In fact, this peculiarity implies, in turn, a lower 
relevance of fixed assets and an ability to generate a higher level of revenues per unit of invested 
capital. In this regard, it is possible to understand that the level of equity needed for undertaking a 
productive activity has to be connected to the nature of that activity, which can be more or less 
capital or labour-intensive. The level of equity has to be commensurate with the long-term optimal 
capitalization level in a specific sector, while at the same time different firm types can achieve 
efficient production by using different factor mixes (more or less capital intensive).     
Especially under-researched are the specific effects of the presence of collective or non-
divided ownership on productivity. The Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago (2012) study considers the total 
effects on productivity of capitalization in French co-operatives, but it does not single out the 
specific effect of the presence of collective reserves, even if the authors themselves state that a 
large portion of surpluses in French co-ops is reinvested into non-divided reserves of capital.4 The 
lack of high-powered financial incentives (e.g. as created by share-ownership, profit sharing and 
employee stock ownership) would lead one to presume that collective ownership decreases 
productivity. On the other hand, patrimonial stability may be a positive feature of collective 
ownership, since the capital of the enterprise cannot be shared and distribution of dividends is 
limited and strongly regulated by law, while the greatest part of positive net residuals is reinvested 
into indivisible reserves (Tortia, 2007). These institutional constraints force the creation of collective 
funds that can have an insurance function against the risk of lay-off and unemployment, and that 
can favour the preservation of the stock of human capital of the organization during downturns of 
demand (Tortia, 2018). Cooperatives may be able to internalize worker-specific effects that are not 
internalized optimally in capitalist enterprises. Especially, these effects are related to limited 
information, contrasting interests and optimal accumulation of human capital. While the role of 
 
4 The minimum legally required annual plowback in French worker co-ops (SCOPS) is 25% of profit, though in 
practice SCOPs choose to retain on average about 45% of profit in this way. Collective capital reserves 
amounted to approximately US$ 36,200 per employee on average in 2006, equivalent to about 21 
months of median private sector pay (Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago, 2012: 852). 
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workers as members and insiders in decision-making processes in cooperatives can favour the 
production of better information flows, and optimal decisions concerning human capital 
accumulation, contract incompleteness in the presence of limited information and contrasting 
interest in capitalist enterprises would result in increased agency costs and lower than optimal 
interaction between workers and the organization. The possibility to store and use additional 
resources (collective funds) to improve worker welfare, favour optimal accumulation of human 
capital and reduce the negative effects of cyclical fluctuations (e.g. layoffs during downturns) can 
result in human capital preservation and even in increased productivity. Hence, the explanation of 
the apparent contradictions we just highlighted: worker cooperatives do not appear to be strongly 
undercapitalized or to perform worse than IOFs even in the presence of large shares of shares of 
collective ownership in their capital structure. Furthermore, both in Italy and in France, cooperatives 
appear to plough back in indivisible reserved much more than is required by law, this way incurring a 
risk of dampening their own economic incentives. These additional effects, even when they increase 
costs by reducing lay-offs and by making decision making processes less expeditious, do not 
necessarily result in inefficient allocation of the inputs of production. They may more simply create 
different (and new) organizational patterns requiring different input mixes and partially different 
technologies, usually in the direction of making labour a more specific and less standard factor of 
production and in implementing, comparatively, more labour intensive production processes using 
partially different technologies. This does not need to result in lower efficiency. It may, instead, be 
interpreted a move away from isomorphism in the direction of institutional and organizational 
variety (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983).  
Theoretical contributions and empirical test are limited and sparse and our work aims to 
contribute new results in this vein. A central aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which 
internal finance and collective property rights affect the total factor productivity of cooperatives 
using longitudinal analysis and controlling for sector, firm characteristic and other possible 
confounding effects. 
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Figure 1. Internal versus external finance for cooperatives. 
Q = output, K = capital input, L = labour input, p = price of output, 𝑓௄ = marginal product of 
capital, 𝑓௅ = marginal product of labour, r = rate of interest, d = premium required because 
of the Furubotn-Pejovich effect 
 
2.2 Risk-sharing in worker cooperatives 
Risk-sharing is the central concept in a second set of arguments that militate against the feasibility of 
worker ownership and control over the enterprise.  The argument starts from the observation that 
shareholders can differentiate their financial investments, while workers cannot, since the 
accumulation of their human capital leads to sunk utilization in one or few economic activities 
(Meade, 1972, 1986). Specialization of human capital can lead to the creation of positive rents over 
and above the market wage rate. However, this outcome is time and effort consuming, and comes at 
the cost of foregoing alternative occupations. This fundamental difference in risk bearing between 
holders of shares and holders of human capital would lead workers to implement “implicit 
contracts” with employers (Azariadis 1975; Azariadis and Stiglitz 1983; Baily 1974). Risk averse 
workers would renounce running an independent economic activity in exchange for stable and 
riskless economic remuneration received from their risk-neutral employer (Knight, 1921). This 
condition would be violated in worker-run enterprises, since in this case workers would have to 
invest both their human capital and financial wealth in the same economic activity, which is a risky 
venture, leaving no room for differentiation. The rarity of worker co-operatives would be explained 
Frisch 
locus
fL = Q/L
pfK + r
pfK = r + d
internal 
finance
external finance
L
K
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by the incompatibility between worker risk aversion and the highly risky environment of worker run 
enterprises. On the other hand, the possibility to differentiate investments would make financial 
investors less risk averse than workers, putting them in the best position to hire and guarantee a 
stable income stream to workers. The principal agent relation that characterizes the employment 
contract would give employers supervisory power over workers. Investment in a risky 
entrepreneurial venture bestows upon share-owners’ residual control and residual appropriation 
rights, which implies that control mechanisms and economic incentives are set in place to align the 
agents’ (workers’) objectives with the objectives of the organization, in line with the principal agent 
framework and in the commodity theory of the firm (Putterman, 1988; Prendergast, 1999).  
Employers as principals in worker-run enterprises embody ownership rights over the organization, 
which implies the possibility to set strategic and production objectives in line with profit 
maximization. This allows the capitalistic enterprise to achieve maximum efficiency in a way that 
cannot be replicated by self-managed groups of peers (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  
This well-known argument is fundamentally flawed for at least five groups of reasons. First, investing 
by human and financial capital in the same economic venture is actually what all self-employed 
workers (e.g. artisans, craftsmen, dealers, retailers, shopkeepers, professionals do and have always 
done). Consequently, it is not necessary to assume a low degree of risk aversion to accept the idea 
that workers can managed at one and the same time both human and financial investments in one 
and the same venture. In other words, the conclusion implicit in this line of argument is that only 
very risk averse workers prefer employment in capitalist enterprises to self-employment in 
cooperatives. The problem of differentiation of financial risk has more to do with collective action 
and coordination, not with intrinsic psychological features of workers (risk-aversion). Second, not all 
capitalistic entrepreneurs are able to fully differentiate their financial investments. The financial 
structure of sole ownership and small enterprises is indeed characterized by a high degree of 
concentration of highly sunk investments. This can make entrepreneurs risk averse in a way similar 
to workers. On the other hand, workers themselves can behave as capitalist entrepreneurs in micro 
economic activities and invest their financial wealth in the same economic activity in which they 
work. Correspondingly, also members of worker-run enterprises can partially differentiate their 
financial investments by saving and investing in low-risk or riskless financial activities what is left 
after investments in their own co-operative have been carried out. Third, even if capitalist 
enterprises stabilize workers’ income stream and workers bear no relevant financial risk, the total 
amount of economic risk borne by workers should include also the expected costs of layoff, and 
other negative events related to the employment relation, for example the danger of exploitation 
and unfair treatment (Navarra and Tortia, 2014; Albanese et al., 2015, 2019). Indeed, several 
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contributions show that worker cooperatives are characterized by more fluctuating wages and more 
stable employment patterns when compared to capitalist enterprises. The main function of wage 
flexibility in cooperatives is likely to be employment stabilization (Craig and Pencavel, 1992; Pencavel 
and Craig, 1994; Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2006; Burdin and Dean, 2009). Third, in most 
contemporary cooperative systems the largest share of investments is carried out directly by the 
organization in which worker-members are employed, not by worker themselves. The simplest 
instance of this kind of pattern is the retention by the firm of part or all positive residuals, which are 
then locked into indivisible reserves or trust funds, to carry out investment programmes. In other 
words, in this kind of systems, workers’ intervention with personal financial resources is to be 
considered the exception more than the rule, if not in the very specific case of the creation of a new 
cooperative (when workers may be forced to invest their own financial resources). Again, financial 
risks undergone by worker-members are, in general, no higher than risks undergone by employees in 
capitalist enterprises. Finally, the total economic risk undergone by capitalist entrepreneurs is 
indeed at least partly borne by workers. While the expected benefits of financial investments accrue 
to the owners of the enterprise in terms of increased profits and shareholder value, the expected 
costs of negative economic outcomes are partially borne by workers in terms of expected lower 
wages, or layoff costs (search and matching costs, retraining, geographical relocation etc.; see for 
example Navarra and Tortia, 2014). Total risks and costs attached to the different position of worker 
members in cooperatives and of employees in capitalist enterprises cannot be easily ascertained and 
compared. They require detailed description and focussed empirical testing. As for the 
consequences of different ownership structures on productivity, this comparison too is complex and 
not amenable to clear cut simplification: the agency relation between employer and employee, and 
exclusive governance in capitalistic enterprises is substituted by horizontal monitoring, peer 
pressure and inclusive governance in cooperatives. Different agency relations are likely to result in 
different economic processes (different optimal mixes of physical and human capital; see the results 
by Conte and Svejnar (1988); Berman and Berman (1989); Estrin (1991); Craig and Pencavel, (1992, 
1995); Pencavel and Craig (1994); Jones (2007); Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago (2012). It is largely an 
empirical matter to test what ownership structure achieves the highest degree of efficiency. Given 
the absence of overarching theoretical arguments and of definitive empirical results, empirical tests 
of productivity and efficiency in co-operatives acquire a fundamental role (Bonin, Jones and 
Putterman (1993); Dow (2003, 2018); Tortia, 2003)). Beyond comparing cooperatives and investor 
owned companies, different capital structures in cooperatives, for example characterized by the 
presence or absence of collective ownership, can lead to different outcomes in terms of efficiency 
and productivity, and deserve specialized analysis, such as the one we present in this paper.     
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3 Italian Cooperatives 
 
In this paper we analyse data on two types of Italian cooperative, workers’ cooperatives (cooperative 
di produzione e lavoro, Production and Work Co-operatives, as defined by Italian legislation, 
D.Lgs.C.P.S. 1577/47)5 and social cooperatives (cooperative sociali, as defined by a dedicated piece 
of legislation: law 381/1991). The former operate according to the tenets of the International 
Cooperative Alliance. Control rights are exercised via, “one vote per member” arrangements and 
membership is not tradable. Most but not all workers are cooperative members, but our data set 
does not allow us to distinguish labour supplied by cooperative members from that supplied by non-
members. There is limited subscription of capital (purchase of co-operative shares) by worker-
members and returns to subscribed capital are also limited (no more than 2.5 percentage points 
above the market interest rate. Individual capital stakes can, in principle, be redeemed by worker-
members upon quitting the organization. The co-operative has to pay out the upfront value of these 
shares within about one year of members’ departure. Worker-members can lend to their 
cooperatives at market interest rates (this is a specifically regulated financial instrument named 
Member Loan). These loans attract tax advantages, but overall the tax burden on cooperatives is no 
lower than on other comparable Italian firms6 (see Fontanari and Borzaga, 2018). A proportion of 
annual profits is deposited in a collective reserve funds, which cannot be redeemed by individual 
worker-members leaving the cooperative. In case of liquidation of the organization, the residual 
value of collective reserves is paid out to national associations of co-operatives enterprises, which 
have to reinvest this sum in new co-operative ventures nationwide. The size of this reserve fund 
provides a proxy for the extent of collective property rights. The remainder of annual profits are 
 
5 The fundamental law for all Italian co-operative enterprises, not only worker, but also consumer, producer, 
credit, social, etc., is the so call Basevi law – named after the Parliamentary promoter of the law - D.Lgs.C.P.S. 
n. 1577/47 – issued by Provisional Head of State in 1947. 
6 From a fiscal point of view, it is necessary to take into account not only single taxes - particularly those based 
on profits not distributed to their owners - but the concept of "fiscal burden", which considers the total 
amount of resources transferred in various ways by firms to the state coffers. This variable allows the 
quantification of not only the taxes related to the corporate income, but also those levied on labour cost (and 
the correlated social security costs). Using this calculation method, the effects of a different final distribution 
of income to the production factors are taken into account. 
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returned to members via remunerating capital underwritten by members, a bonus proportional to 
labour supply, or the provision of social and other benefits. 
Italian social cooperatives are multi-stakeholder cooperatives. Their purpose is to provide social 
services, which supplement or substitute provision by central or local government. These include 
care for the disabled, the elderly and children. Thomas (2004) discusses the role of Italian social 
cooperatives in the provision of social welfare services. Some social cooperatives have a specialised 
function in assisting previously unemployed people and to integrate them into employment. 
Stakeholders can include paid workers, volunteers (up to 50% of cooperative members), some public 
institutions, outside investors (without control rights) and, importantly, beneficiaries of the 
cooperatives activities. Italian social cooperatives have legal personality and limited liability. Control 
rights are exercised on a one vote per member basis. A maximum of 67% of profits can be 
distributed7 and the interest rate is limited to a particular bond rate. Assets cannot be distributed. 
There are two type of social cooperative in Italy. Type A cooperatives supply educational, social or 
health services. Type B cooperatives assist disadvantaged workers to help them integrate into 
employment. Disadvantaged persons include those with physical or mental disability, developmental 
disorders, and drug and alcohol addiction. They do not include other categories of disadvantage such 
as sexism, racism, homophobia or domestic violence. In B-Type cooperatives a minimum of 30% of 
members must come from the target disadvantaged groups. A small number of Italian cooperatives 
have both Type A and Type B legal status. 
According to the first official report carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2019) 
and by the European Research Institute on Cooperatives and Social Enterprises (EURICSE, 2015), 
worker and social cooperatives represented respectively 49.2 % (29,414 units) and 24.2% (14,263 
units) of the total number of cooperatives operating in Italy. 
Besides representing the largest number of companies, worker and social cooperatives are also the 
two cooperative forms that generated the greatest value-added: respectively 12.9 and 8.1 billion 
euros equal, overall, to 73.4 % of the value-added produced by all Italian cooperatives in 2015. 
The data on the number of employees confirm the importance of worker and social cooperatives: 
four employees out of ten are employed in worker cooperatives and three out of 10 in social 
 
7 Italian cooperatives have to allocate to mandatory indivisible reserve 30% of the annual profit plus 3% to the 
national mutual funds that are in charge of financing new cooperative ventures nationwide. This way, the 
distributable share of annual profits is 67%. 
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cooperatives. At a more general level, all the Italian cooperatives taken together contribute 4.4% of 
GDP and 7.4% of employment in the private sector8. 
The greater incidence of Italian cooperatives in terms of employment, as compared to their weight 
in terms of value-added, highlights their labour-intensive nature. This peculiarity also emerges from 
the analysis of the value-added distribution to the production factors. In fact, in Italian cooperatives, 
the weight of labour cost is equal to 86 cents per euro of value-added. This is true especially in the 
case of worker cooperatives with a share of 88 cents and in the case of social cooperatives with 92 
cents per euro of value-added. In the other firm types this coefficient is no higher than 52 cents. 
In addition, another study (Fontanari and Borzaga, 2018), which examines the balance sheets of 
cooperatives and investor-owned firms operating in Italy in 2015, shows that the financial 
equilibrium (both short and long term) of the former is not inferior to that of the latter. This study 
uses neutral indicators that are capable of correctly and simultaneously interpreting the peculiarities 
of both enterprise forms. In particular, in the case of worker and social cooperatives, where labour is 
the specific resource of the firm, we find more interesting results. Taking into consideration the long-
term indicator, we find that each unit of capital invested in long-term assets is more than covered by 
the sum of long-term debts and equity, and to a greater extent than investor-owned firms. 
Specifically, the long-term index is equals to 147% and 138% respectively in the case of social and 
worker cooperatives compared to 105% in joint-stock companies, and 128% in limited liability 
companies.      
The same study also underlines that during the economic crisis Italian cooperatives managed to 
increase their equity more than investor-owned firms: + 29.5% from 2008 to 2015 in cooperatives 
compared to 20.5% in joint-stock companies (Società per Azioni) and 18.1% in limited liability 
companies (Società a Responsabilità Limitata). Likewise, as regards total assets, the growth rate 
recorded by cooperatives (+ 16.4%) in the same time span is in line with that of joint-stock 
companies (+ 18.3%), but much higher than that of limited liability companies (+11.1%). 
These initial results are in line with the idea that cooperatives are less capitalized than investor 
owned companies and self-select into labour-intensive sectors (Podivinsky and Stewart, 2006). 
However, they do not support different hypotheses concerning degeneration (Ben-Ner, 1984, 1988), 
since most workers are also members and not simple employees in Italian worker cooperatives. 
Neither do they indicate an inability to survive in competitive contexts, as a large share of existing 
 
8 These results only refer to the direct impact. A non-published study (Fontanari, Borzaga, forthcoming) reveals 
the total weight (direct, indirect and induced) of the Italian cooperatives on the national economy rises to 
almost 7% of the GDP and around 9% of the employment.  
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co-operatives have been active for several decades, and a growing number are now aged more than 
one-hundred years. As already stated, differences in factor utilization (labour and physical assets) 
between cooperatives and investor owned companies, are clearly apparent as in France (Fakhfakh, 
Perotin and Gago, 2012). On the other hand, the ability of Italian co-operatives to reach financial 
equilibrium on their own terms, as shown by Fontanari and Borzaga (2018), can  can cast doubt on 
the theoretical assumptions of the claim that co-operatives would undergo fatal difficulties to 
finance themselves and to achieve efficient production. Lastly, standard economic theory discussed 
in Section 2 above, is less applicable to social than to workers’ cooperatives, particularly to B-Type 
social co-ops. It is nonetheless important to analyse the determinants of their productivity. 
 
4 The Data Set 
 
The data set was built by combining three different administrative sources.  First of all, Aida Bureau 
Van Dijk, which collects the balance sheet data of all companies that have the obligation to record 
them at the Chamber of Commerce, that is, in Italian legislation, cooperatives and investor-owned 
firms (joint-stock companies – SPAs – and limited liability companies – SRLs). Secondly, the Italian 
social security database gathering data on employment, from which it was possible to calculate the 
full-time equivalent units of labour (FTE) from the total number of labour contracts signed by the 
relevant cooperatives. Thirdly, the Cooperative register kept by the Ministry for Economic 
Development, which allows to classify Italian cooperatives by type (worker, consumer, social, etc.).  
The resulting database was organised using Stata 15, as a panel of 11,289 cooperatives over seven 
years, from 2008 to 2014, yielding 79,023 observations. The panel included 5,834 workers’ 
cooperatives and 5,455 social cooperatives. Outlier observations with negative value-added, 
negative fixed capital or zero FTE values were dropped prior to the regressions being carried out, 
reducing the panel to 11,139 cooperatives (5,753 workers’ cooperatives and 5,386 social 
cooperatives), and reducing the number of observations from 79,023 to 74,853, leaving the panel 
slightly unbalanced. The final data set included 45 variables. 
The data set included cooperatives from six sectors of the Italian economy as follows: 
           1 Agrofood (246 cooperatives) 
           2 Distributive trades (407 cooperatives) 
           3 Health and social assistance (3,105 cooperatives) 
           4 Non-food industry (1,864 cooperatives) 
           5 Other services (4,390 cooperatives)  
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           6 Transport and storage (1,127 cooperatives) 
 
The data set included cooperatives from all regions of Italy as follows: 
1. Central (2,209 cooperatives) 
2. Islands (1,555 cooperatives) 
3. Northeast (2,311 cooperatives) 
4. Northwest (2,691 cooperatives) 
5. South (2,373 cooperatives) 
For completeness, sectoral and regional regression results are reported in Appendix 1. 
The data set included social cooperatives of the three types described in Section 3 above, though some 
social cooperatives could not be classified as any of these three types. Numbers of cooperatives of 
each type were as follows: 
1. Type A: 3,094 cooperatives 
2. Type A and B: 312 cooperatives 
3. Type B: 1,419 cooperatives 
For completeness regression results for each type of social cooperative are reported in Appendix A2. 
 
5 Econometric Model 
5.1 Construction of variables 
In our longitudinal model, variables were defined as follows: 
 realQ (output: Q) = value-added deflated by the Italian GDP deflator 
 realK (fixed capital: K) = tangible fixed assets + intangible fixed assets, deflated by the Italian 
GDP deflator) 
 realmemberscap (real members’ capital: C) = the value of members’ shares, deflated by the 
Italian GDP deflator 
 FTE (L) = fulltime equivalent labour input (i.e. adjusted for part-time workers) 
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 realCRFperhead (proxy for the extent of collective property rights: X1) = collective reserve 
fund per FTE worker, deflated by the Italian GDP deflator. Collective reserve fund (CRF) is 
defined as Equity – Members’ Capital – Net Income of the Year. 
 SFI (self-financing index9, a proxy for the extent of internal finance: X2) = Equity/Fixed Assets 
 age = number of years since the cooperative was first registered with the Chamber of 
Commerce. 
The variable “dummy” takes the value 1 for workers’ cooperatives and 2 for social cooperatives. 
Dummy variables were also created to distinguish the different types of social cooperative (Type A 
and B). Further sectoral and regional dummies were created: sectoral and regional results are 
reported in Appendix 1. Regression results for the three categories of social cooperative are 
reported in Appendix 2. The final data set included 45 variables. Summary statistics for the key 
variables are shown in Table 1 (all coops), Table 2 (workers’ coops) and Table 3 (social coops). 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for key variables (all coops). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 This choice follows the reasoning presented in the theoretical part about the importance of linking the equity 
to long-term investments and whose level is related to the nature of the productive activity.   
         age       74,853    6081.941     4417.85         33      50335
         SFI       74,825    5.830297    421.1202     -73141      47522
                                                                       
realCRFper~d       74,850    209.2729    3744.784  -102556.3   921593.1
realmember~p       74,850    919.0867    8909.113  -101.4146   493030.9
         FTE       74,853    32.16823    153.5764   .0032051     9254.8
       realK       74,838    4267.405    39406.29   .0095135    2752958
       realQ       74,853    10518.89    55854.28   .0401276    2838445
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Table 2. Summary statistics for key variables (worker’s coops). 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for key variables (social coops). 
5.2 Model specification 
The econometric analysis is based on the estimation of augmented production functions for 
workers’ and social cooperatives, using the data set described in Section 4 above. We start from an 
augmented Cobb-Douglas productions function: 
𝑄 = A. exp(𝛾ଵ. 𝑋ଵ + 𝛾ଶ. 𝑋ଶ) . 𝐾ఈ𝐿ఉ𝐶ఋ     (1) 
Taking logs and re-arranging (1) yields: 
ln ொ
௅
= ln𝐴 + 𝛼 ln ௄
௅
+ 𝛿 ln ஼
௅
+ (𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 1) ln 𝐿 + (𝛾ଵ. 𝑋ଵ + 𝛾ଶ. 𝑋ଶ)   (2) 
The age of each cooperative was included as an independent variable, defined as number of days 
since the cooperative was first registered with the Chamber of Commerce. We have included this 
variable because it can influence the level of capital accumulation and the ‘economic path’ of a firm.   
All cooperatives in the dataset were extant for each of the seven years it covers. It was not possible 
to account for any mergers or takeovers which may have occurred during that seven years period. 
         age       38,574    6439.913    5047.196         33      50335
         SFI       38,563    5.743148    405.8637     -61534      47522
                                                                       
realCRFper~d       38,572     248.726    4829.223  -13461.03   921593.1
realmember~p       38,572    1187.789    11907.38  -101.4146   493030.9
         FTE       38,574    29.15498    178.4868   .0032051     9254.8
       realK       38,570      4893.1    53237.73   .0095135    2752958
       realQ       38,574    10911.04    69444.08   .0401276    2838445
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
         age       36,279    5701.324      3592.1         42      45200
         SFI       36,262    5.922975    436.7661     -73141      30107
                                                                       
realCRFper~d       36,278    167.3249    2033.327  -102556.3   204848.3
realmember~p       36,278    633.3928     3585.53          0   163227.8
         FTE       36,279    35.37209    121.5373    .008547    3857.55
       realK       36,268    3601.995    13758.75   .0095135   549463.9
       realQ       36,279    10101.93     36179.4   .5216484    1264505
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
17 
 
The variable “dummy” was also included, taking the value 1 for workers’ coops and 2 for social 
coops. 
5.3 Methods of estimation 
Equation (2) was estimated using the dataset described in Section 4, using the Stata 15 package. 
Initially OLS was used with the entire dataset (after dropping outliers) included in the regression: the 
results are reported in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. OLS regression 
 
Both the capital intensity variables (logCapIntensity and logmemberscapintensity) have positive 
coefficients, significant at 5%, though the coefficient on fixed capital intensity is approximately three 
times the coefficient on members’ capital intensity. The coefficient on full time equivalent units of 
labour (logFTE) is not significantly different from zero (at the 5% level) implying that 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛿 = 1. 
This in turn implies that cooperatives are operating under constant returns to scale, at the 
technically efficient (minimum long-run average cost) scale of production. The coefficient on 
collective reserve funds (realCRFperhead) is significantly positive (at the 5% level), suggesting that 
collective property rights improve productivity. The coefficient on the self-finance index (SFI) is not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting no negative effect of internal (or external) finance on 
productivity. Co-operatives appear instead to optimally arbitrage internal and external funds at the 
margin, coherently with static trade-off theory of capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958)  The 
age variable has a significantly positive coefficient, implying that older co-ops are more productive 
than younger ones, probably due to the presence of a partial non-profit constraint and the asset 
lock, which favour capital accumulation over time. The dummy variable has a significantly negative 
coefficient, suggesting that social cooperatives are less productive than worker cooperatives. 
There is clearly a problem with omitted variables, which suggests recourse to fixed effects 
regressions. The dummy variables described above are clearly co-linear with the cooperative-specific 
                 _cons     5.574351   .0079426   701.83   0.000     5.558784    5.589918
                 dummy    -.1648253   .0039429   -41.80   0.000    -.1725534   -.1570972
                   age     8.27e-06   4.74e-07    17.46   0.000     7.34e-06    9.20e-06
                   SFI     7.78e-06   4.54e-06     1.71   0.087    -1.12e-06    .0000167
        realCRFperhead     .0000113   5.13e-07    21.97   0.000     .0000103    .0000123
                logFTE     .0000807   .0013889     0.06   0.954    -.0026414    .0028029
logmemberscapintensity     .0247154    .001017    24.30   0.000     .0227221    .0267086
       logCapintensity     .0718941   .0010374    69.30   0.000     .0698609    .0739274
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
18 
 
intercepts required by fixed effects, and accordingly are omitted by Stata. So separate fixed effects 
regressions were carried out for the different cooperative types. Dummy variables for geographical 
region and economic sector were treated in the same way. Results from the fixed effects regressions 
are shown in Table 5 (workers’ cooperatives) and Table 6 (social cooperatives). 
 
Table 5. Fixed effects regression for workers’ cooperatives 
 
 
 
Table 6. Fixed effect regression for social cooperatives 
 
 
The coefficients on both types of capital input are significantly positive and lower for social 
cooperatives, confirming the result of the OLS regression that social cooperatives have lower total 
factor productivity than workers’ cooperatives. For each type of cooperative, the fixed effects 
coefficients for the two types of capital are of similar size, contrasting with the OLS coefficients. For 
each type of cooperative, the coefficient on the labour input (FTE) is significantly negative, indicating 
that both types of co-operative firm operate under decreasing returns to scale (i.e. they are not “too 
small”). The coefficient on collective property rights (realCRFperhead) is significantly positive for 
both types of cooperative, confirming the OLS result that collective property rights improve total 
factor productivity. For social cooperatives the coefficient on self-financing (SFI) is significantly 
                                                                                        
                 _cons     5.856784   .0275245   212.78   0.000     5.802835    5.910733
                   age     5.36e-06   2.69e-06     1.99   0.047     7.92e-08    .0000106
                   SFI     7.43e-06   5.49e-06     1.35   0.176    -3.33e-06    .0000182
        realCRFperhead     7.25e-06   4.38e-07    16.53   0.000     6.39e-06    8.10e-06
                logFTE    -.2173471   .0057099   -38.06   0.000    -.2285388   -.2061555
logmemberscapintensity     .0407373   .0038109    10.69   0.000     .0332677    .0482069
       logCapintensity     .0538911   .0028223    19.09   0.000     .0483593    .0594229
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.605009   .0206166   271.87   0.000       5.5646    5.645418
                   age     .0000423   2.39e-06    17.71   0.000     .0000377     .000047
                   SFI    -.0000153   4.27e-06    -3.58   0.000    -.0000237   -6.93e-06
        realCRFperhead     5.50e-06   1.97e-06     2.80   0.005     1.64e-06    9.36e-06
                logFTE    -.1769469   .0050537   -35.01   0.000    -.1868523   -.1670414
logmemberscapintensity     .0201292   .0028183     7.14   0.000     .0146052    .0256532
       logCapintensity     .0375399   .0023138    16.22   0.000     .0330049     .042075
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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negative, indicating a negative effect on total factor productivity (in contrast with the OLS results). 
For workers’ cooperatives the self-financing effect is not significantly different from zero. The age 
variable has a significantly positive coefficient for both types of cooperative.  
 
5.4 Members’ capital as an augmenting variable 
It could be argued that members’ capital should be treated as an augmenting variable rather than an 
input in the conventional sense. That is the production function (1) should be specified as: 
  𝑄 = A. exp(𝛾ଵ. 𝑋ଵ + 𝛾ଶ. 𝑋ଶ + 𝛾ଷ𝑋ଷ) . 𝐾ఈ𝐿ఉ     (3) 
where: 𝑋ଷ = memberscapintensity.  
To investigate this possibility the above regressions were re-run with the variable 
“memberscapintensity” included in levels rather than logs. The results are reported in Table 7 
(workers’ cooperatives) and Table 8 (social cooperatives). 
 
Table 7. Members’ capital intensity as an augmenting variable (workers’ cooperatives) 
 
Table 8. Members’ capital intensity as an augmenting variable (social cooperatives) 
 
Results change quantitatively, but not qualitatively, and collective capital still has positive and 
significant effect on productivity. All our estimates confirm a positive and significant impact of 
              _cons     5.970509   .0253558   235.47   0.000     5.920811    6.020207
                age     7.68e-06   2.69e-06     2.86   0.004     2.41e-06    .0000129
                SFI     7.60e-06   5.50e-06     1.38   0.167    -3.18e-06    .0000184
     realCRFperhead     .0000139   2.64e-06     5.26   0.000     8.72e-06    .0000191
memberscapintensity    -8.20e-06   3.34e-06    -2.45   0.014    -.0000148   -1.65e-06
             logFTE    -.2470666   .0049443   -49.97   0.000    -.2567576   -.2373756
    logCapintensity     .0562969   .0028155    20.00   0.000     .0507784    .0618154
                                                                                     
         loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
              _cons     5.639087   .0195522   288.41   0.000     5.600764     5.67741
                age      .000045   2.33e-06    19.28   0.000     .0000404    .0000495
                SFI    -.0000153   4.26e-06    -3.58   0.000    -.0000236   -6.92e-06
     realCRFperhead     .0000218   2.42e-06     9.01   0.000     .0000171    .0000266
memberscapintensity     .0000202   1.74e-06    11.62   0.000     .0000168    .0000236
             logFTE    -.1851405   .0045764   -40.46   0.000    -.1941104   -.1761706
    logCapintensity     .0380383   .0023027    16.52   0.000     .0335248    .0425517
                                                                                     
         loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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collective capital reserves of productivity, though this impact appears to be much stronger in worker 
than in social cooperatives. Since this is one of the main results in our study and needs clarification. 
The impact of collective capital on productivity is calculated net of the impact of tangible and 
intangible fixed assets, it means that collective capital exerts its own influences over and above the 
level of capitalization per se. That is, it is not just a matter of the quantity of accumulated collective 
capital, as measured by factor elasticities (the coefficient 𝛼 in the regression model) and by the 
marginal productivity of capital, but also of its economic function, which has been often 
hypothesized to have a negative role in business enterprises (due to the dampening of economic and 
financial incentives). We find, instead, a positive and robust role of collective capital. It is worth 
exploring these functions, which may be connected to different factors, as collective capital: (i) 
stabilizes production plans, since it is under the strict control of co-operative managers. It allows 
management to organize effectively the existing assets and to combine them with stable 
organizational routines and human resource management; (ii) being owned by the co-operative 
itself, it allows co-operatives to plan investment programs in the medium to long run. Given the old 
age of a large share of Italian co-operatives, it appears indeed that collective capital can help them 
overcome the horizon problem. Far from causing under-investments, under appropriate conditions, 
collective capital can have the function of completing the limited temporally horizon of worker-
members in investment decisions and in the deployment of production plans. In this, governance, 
not economic incentives, is likely to have a more fundamental role in reaching efficient outcomes 
(Ostrom, 1990; Tortia, 2018). 
 
 
6 Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we strove to replicate and advance previous results concerning efficiency and factor 
utilization of cooperative enterprises, especially focussing on issues relating to under-investments, 
and on the relevance (positive, negative or neutral) role of collective reserves of capital in enhancing 
co-operative efficiency. We do this on country-wide data on Italian worker and social cooperatives. 
Our worker is closest to the paper by Fakhfakh, Peroting and Gago (2012), who performed a similar 
analysis using French national data.  Contrary to expectations derived from economic theory we do 
not find that collective capital engenders under-capitalization in terms of a too low scale of 
production (increasing returns to scale). Quite the contrary, we find that cooperatives operate either 
at constant of decreasing returns to scale (they are not under-capitalized). Furthermore, correlation 
analysis shows that older co-ops are more capitalized than younger ones, and this implies that co-
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operatives do indeed increase capitalization over long spells of time (a result that is not coherent 
with the under-capitalization hypotheses). Furthermore, the correlation between collective capital 
and fixed assets is itself positive, implying that collective capital does not hamper the accumulation 
of fixed assets. Quite the contrary, it looks like that more abundant collective capital favours more 
investments and capitalization, probably due to the availability of more collateral guarantees that 
allow the attainment of cheaper borrowing from financial institutions.  
In more general terms, when productivity and efficient production are considered, our analysis 
indicates that collective property rights do not impair productivity, as the presence of collective 
reserves appear to unambiguously increase the efficiency of production. We strove to explain what 
positive economic and financial functions are played by this kind of property (e.g. stabilization of 
production and investment plans over and above the quantitative dimension of fixed capital and 
completion of the truncated temporal horizon of members), which would explain its positive impact 
on productivity.  The possibility to use retained earnings and increased fixed assets in production in 
the presence of a partial non-profit distribution constraint and of the asset lock may be sufficient to 
explain this result. Also, there is a significant but small age effect on total factor productivity: older 
cooperatives have higher total factor productivity than younger ones. Again, higher capitalization in 
older cooperatives can imply that better efficiency and higher productivity are achieved over time.  
When results concerning worker cooperatives are compared to the results concerning social 
cooperatives, the latter have lower total factor productivity than the former. On the other hand, 
internal finance does not impair productivity for workers’ cooperatives but may do so for social 
cooperatives. Internal finance may appear to be detrimental in the case of social cooperatives, 
because Type A social cooperatives carry out their activities on the basis of procurement contracts 
and public tenders. Their dominant feature of providers of social services, that are characterized by 
high labour intensity would imply that, even if they are more productive than Type B social 
cooperatives, they need lower amounts of internal funds. On the contrary, industrial social 
cooperatives, which are most of the times of B Type, require higher capitalization to carry out 
industrial production but, at one and the same time, produce a lower value added because they are 
conceived for the re-integration of disadvantaged subjects into the labour market. 
The role and potential of governance rules in complementing individual financial incentives and 
even in replacing them when they lead to inefficient results (under-capitalization), in order to 
achieve completion of members’ truncated temporal horizon, clearly need further theoretical and 
empirical investigation. The solution of different fundamental social dilemmas in collective 
entrepreneurial action (e.g. tragedy of the commons-like situations) represents a conditio sine qua 
non for the achievement of efficient production and capitalization in cooperatives. The literature on 
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the management of common-pool natural resources initiated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990 took 
fundamental steps and reached path-breaking results in highlighting the role of governance, and in 
studying the conditions under which the governance of collective action is likely to succeed or fail in 
achieving efficiency. However, much work is still required, as the role of governance in collective 
action needs to be contextualised in the study of entrepreneurial action and enterprise organization. 
Furthermore, while common goods as natural resources are available in natural settings, 
accumulation of capital in enterprises depends on investment rates through time (Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2017).        
Policy implications require that co-operatives are left to work and to survive and reach 
efficiency on their own terms, without the need to force them to follow the same standards and to 
use the same technologies (combinations of production factors) as conventional enterprises. This is 
in contrast with well-known isomorphism hypotheses.   
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Appendix 1. Sectoral and regional regressions 
The dummy variable “msectordummy” was created to represent six sectors of the economy, as 
follows: 
           1 Agrofood 
           2 Distributive trades 
           3 Health and social assistance 
           4 Non-food industry 
           5 Other services 
           6 Transport and storage 
Sectoral regression results are reported in Tables A1 – A6. 
 
Table A1. Agrofood  
 
 
Table A2. Distributive trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 _cons     5.367127    .160907    33.36   0.000     5.051485    5.682769
                   age     8.89e-06   .0000133     0.67   0.503    -.0000171    .0000349
                   SFI      .001388     .00033     4.21   0.000     .0007406    .0020353
        realCRFperhead    -.0000871   .0000221    -3.93   0.000    -.0001305   -.0000436
                logFTE    -.1635919    .030841    -5.30   0.000     -.224091   -.1030929
logmemberscapintensity     .0092728   .0171894     0.54   0.590    -.0244467    .0429923
       logCapintensity     .1276538     .01835     6.96   0.000     .0916576      .16365
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.413744   .1181195    45.83   0.000     5.182113    5.645375
                   age     .0000185   .0000124     1.49   0.135    -5.78e-06    .0000427
                   SFI     .0005016    .000201     2.50   0.013     .0001074    .0008957
        realCRFperhead    -.0000185   .0000146    -1.27   0.204     -.000047    .0000101
                logFTE    -.2803837   .0296303    -9.46   0.000    -.3384883   -.2222791
logmemberscapintensity     .0658933   .0180296     3.65   0.000     .0305375    .1012491
       logCapintensity     .0825144   .0138109     5.97   0.000     .0554314    .1095974
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table A3. Health and social assistance 
 
 
 
Table A4. Non-food industry 
 
Table A5. Other services 
 
 
 
Table A6. Transport and storage 
                 _cons     5.680588   .0254706   223.03   0.000     5.630663    5.730512
                   age     .0000493   2.86e-06    17.19   0.000     .0000436    .0000549
                   SFI    -.0000187   4.20e-06    -4.45   0.000    -.0000269   -.0000104
        realCRFperhead     2.12e-06   2.59e-06     0.82   0.413    -2.95e-06    7.19e-06
                logFTE    -.1870752    .006177   -30.29   0.000    -.1991827   -.1749678
logmemberscapintensity     .0213624   .0033938     6.29   0.000     .0147102    .0280147
       logCapintensity     .0311498   .0027323    11.40   0.000     .0257942    .0365054
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     6.010925   .0477499   125.88   0.000     5.917326    6.104524
                   age    -.0000152   4.37e-06    -3.47   0.001    -.0000237   -6.61e-06
                   SFI     .0000196   7.95e-06     2.47   0.013     4.06e-06    .0000352
        realCRFperhead     .0000161   5.11e-06     3.15   0.002     6.07e-06    .0000261
                logFTE    -.1828755    .009363   -19.53   0.000    -.2012288   -.1645223
logmemberscapintensity     .0289524   .0060736     4.77   0.000      .017047    .0408579
       logCapintensity     .0503954   .0048164    10.46   0.000     .0409543    .0598365
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.682579   .0281596   201.80   0.000     5.627385    5.737774
                   age     .0000263   3.19e-06     8.24   0.000       .00002    .0000326
                   SFI    -2.47e-07   6.53e-06    -0.04   0.970     -.000013    .0000126
        realCRFperhead     7.26e-06   4.50e-07    16.13   0.000     6.38e-06    8.14e-06
                logFTE    -.2402906   .0066244   -36.27   0.000    -.2532748   -.2273064
logmemberscapintensity     .0275811   .0041005     6.73   0.000     .0195438    .0356184
       logCapintensity     .0521264   .0031888    16.35   0.000     .0458762    .0583766
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.649522   .0469293   120.38   0.000     5.557525    5.741519
                   age     .0000178   4.42e-06     4.03   0.000     9.16e-06    .0000265
                   SFI     .0000101   .0001024     0.10   0.921    -.0001907    .0002109
        realCRFperhead     .0000742   7.42e-06    10.00   0.000     .0000596    .0000887
                logFTE    -.0764071   .0090479    -8.44   0.000    -.0941439   -.0586703
logmemberscapintensity     .0405943    .006415     6.33   0.000     .0280188    .0531698
       logCapintensity     .0427654   .0046015     9.29   0.000     .0337449    .0517859
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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The dummy variable “regiondummy” was created to represent five geographical regions as follows: 
1. Central 
2. Islands 
3. Northeast  
4. Northwest 
5. South 
Regional regression results are reported in tables A7- A11. 
Table A7. Central 
 
Table A8. Islands 
 
 
Table A9. Northeast 
                 _cons     5.732333   .0413476   138.64   0.000     5.651286    5.813381
                   age     .0000181   4.18e-06     4.33   0.000     9.91e-06    .0000263
                   SFI     .0001223   .0000581     2.11   0.035     8.49e-06    .0002361
        realCRFperhead     7.04e-06   4.31e-07    16.31   0.000     6.19e-06    7.88e-06
                logFTE    -.2038274   .0090839   -22.44   0.000    -.2216332   -.1860216
logmemberscapintensity     .0351684   .0061058     5.76   0.000        .0232    .0471368
       logCapintensity     .0573995   .0042969    13.36   0.000     .0489769    .0658221
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.691143    .046756   121.72   0.000      5.59949    5.782795
                   age     .0000149   5.36e-06     2.77   0.006     4.36e-06    .0000254
                   SFI     .0001082   .0000599     1.81   0.071    -9.15e-06    .0002255
        realCRFperhead     .0000391   7.89e-06     4.96   0.000     .0000237    .0000546
                logFTE    -.1989925   .0107323   -18.54   0.000    -.2200302   -.1779548
logmemberscapintensity     .0145008   .0062268     2.33   0.020     .0022948    .0267068
       logCapintensity     .0505544   .0055154     9.17   0.000      .039743    .0613658
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons      5.82084   .0377377   154.24   0.000     5.746868    5.894811
                   age     .0000306   3.37e-06     9.09   0.000      .000024    .0000372
                   SFI     .0000811   .0000534     1.52   0.129    -.0000236    .0001858
        realCRFperhead    -.0000182   5.34e-06    -3.42   0.001    -.0000287   -7.79e-06
                logFTE    -.2168758   .0080751   -26.86   0.000    -.2327042   -.2010473
logmemberscapintensity     .0383837   .0045648     8.41   0.000     .0294362    .0473313
       logCapintensity     .0469067    .003768    12.45   0.000     .0395209    .0542925
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table A10. Northwest 
 
 
Table A11. South 
 
 
Appendix 2. Regression results for the three categories of social 
cooperative 
 
Table A12. Social cooperatives type A 
 
 
 
 
 
                 _cons     5.708862   .0300045   190.27   0.000      5.65005    5.767674
                   age     .0000227   3.26e-06     6.95   0.000     .0000163    .0000291
                   SFI     -.000013   3.43e-06    -3.79   0.000    -.0000197   -6.28e-06
        realCRFperhead     .0000201   2.65e-06     7.58   0.000     .0000149    .0000253
                logFTE    -.1401722   .0070056   -20.01   0.000    -.1539041   -.1264404
logmemberscapintensity     .0225721   .0035817     6.30   0.000     .0155515    .0295926
       logCapintensity     .0335242   .0032874    10.20   0.000     .0270804    .0399679
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.568779   .0379177   146.87   0.000     5.494455    5.643103
                   age     .0000283   4.50e-06     6.30   0.000     .0000195    .0000372
                   SFI     .0000202   8.76e-06     2.31   0.021     3.06e-06    .0000374
        realCRFperhead      .000011   2.72e-06     4.06   0.000     5.70e-06    .0000163
                logFTE    -.2031705   .0094504   -21.50   0.000    -.2216947   -.1846462
logmemberscapintensity     .0479274   .0069848     6.86   0.000     .0342362    .0616185
       logCapintensity     .0501079    .004237    11.83   0.000     .0418028     .058413
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 _cons     5.687442   .0276623   205.60   0.000     5.633222    5.741663
                   age       .00005   3.13e-06    15.95   0.000     .0000438    .0000561
                   SFI    -.0000161   4.25e-06    -3.80   0.000    -.0000245   -7.80e-06
        realCRFperhead     3.03e-06   2.82e-06     1.08   0.282    -2.49e-06    8.55e-06
                logFTE    -.2043435   .0068999   -29.62   0.000     -.217868   -.1908191
logmemberscapintensity     .0198762   .0037167     5.35   0.000     .0125912    .0271612
       logCapintensity      .029562   .0029611     9.98   0.000      .023758    .0353661
                                                                                        
            loglabprod        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table A13. Social cooperatives type A+B 
 
 
 
 
Table A14. Social cooperatives type B 
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